Conceptual basis of pain medicine: Fundamental concepts

Abstract
Philosophical theory about the nature of human beings has far reaching consequences on our understanding of various issues faced by them. Once taken as self-evident, it becomes the foundation on which knowledge gets built. The cause of concern is that this theoretical framework rarely gets questioned despite its inherent limitations and self-defeating consequences, leading to crisis in the concerned field. The field, which is facing crisis today, is that of medicine, and the paradigmatic stance that is responsible for the crisis is Cartesian dualism-a view that mind and body are essentially separate entities. This paper discusses Cartesian dualism in the context of the practice of medicine. Focusing more closely on how disease, health and treatment are defined through this position, the paper builds up its critique by throwing light on its accomplishments, limitations and self-defeating consequences. The paper also seeks to understand why this dualism is still alive despite its disavowal from philosophers, health practitioners and lay people.

Abstract
Objective: To identify whether the biopsychosocial framework of illness has overcome the limitations of the biomedical model of disease when applied in the practice of pain medicine.

Design: Critical review of the literature concerning the application of biopsychosocial models to the praxis of pain medicine and the concepts of living systems.

Results: The biopsychosocial model of illness, formulated by Engel in 1977, has generated the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) definition of pain, two major conceptual frameworks in pain medicine, and three putative explanatory models for pain. However, in the absence of a theory that seeks to understand the lived experience of pain as an emergent and unpredictable phenomenon, these progeny of the biopsychosocial model have been caught in circular argument and have been unable to overcome biomedical reductionism or the perpetuation of body-mind dualism. In particular, the implication that pain can be a "thing" separate and distinct from the body bears little relationship to the lived experience of pain. Such marginalizing results when an observer attempts to reduce the experience of the pain of another person.

Conclusions: The self-referentiality of living systems (through their qualities of autopoiesis, noncentrality and negentropy) sees pain "emerge" in unpredictable ways that defy any lineal reduction of the lived experience to any particular "thing." Pain therefore constitutes an aporia, a space and presence that defies us access to its secrets. We suggest a project in which pain may be apprehended in the clinical encounter, through the engagement of two autonomous self-referential beings in the intersubjective or so-called third space, from which new therapeutic possibilities can arise.

Abstract
For many years, placebos have been defined by their inert content and their use as controls in clinical trials and treatments in clinical practice. Recent research shows that placebo effects are genuine psychobiological events attributable to the overall therapeutic context, and that these effects can be robust in both laboratory and clinical settings. There is also evidence that placebo effects can exist in clinical practice, even if no placebo is given. Further promotion and integration of laboratory and clinical research will allow advances in the ethical use of placebo mechanisms that are inherent in routine clinical care, and encourage the use of treatments that stimulate placebo effects.